ABSTRACT: This essay seeks to complicate and integrate Goodnight's spheres-of-argument model by investigating the ethos of the science adviser. Uncertainty types correlate with argument spheres; understanding this-and understanding the science adviser's ethos as both forum-bound role and transgressive character performance-are crucial factors for advisers' selection of appropriate ethical stances in public debates.
INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty as a topic of argument stands in a special relationship to ethos-persuasive performances of authority and character-because there must always be an un/certain "I" or "we." Uncertainty is the goad that drives us to locate ourselves and others on the map of the cosmos, and argumentation is the techne we have developed to manage this cosmology. This was the essential insight behind Thomas Goodnight's (1982) Spheres of Argument model. Goodnight (1982) reasoned that "all argumentation is involved in the creative resolution or the resolute creation of uncertainty" (p. 215) but noted that these arguments appeared to be grounded in three distinct spheres: personal, technical, and public. Managing uncertainty in the personal sphere involved appeals to individual experience or perception and often took place on an intimate scale; managing uncertainty in the technical sphere required the standards and forums of a profession; managing uncertainty in the public sphere recruited shared political values and took place in ostensibly open forums such as courts, legislatures, and rallies (Goodnight, 1982, p. 216 ). Goodnight pointed out that a single issue, such as a murder trial, could recruit reasons from multiple spheres even if it took place in a forum characteristic to one of them (a courtroom); he also demonstrated how an issue, such as a sick child, could initiate in the personal sphere and then move through technical (medical) and public (policy) spheres over time as attempts to resolve its uncertainties recruited larger and larger working groups.
While the spheres model has generated many productive studies of uncertainty, and while Goodnight (1982) hinted that these studies "may illuminate the values, character, and blindspots of an era, society, or person" (p. 216), the role of ethos in the model remains largely unexamined, particularly as it mediates public and technical spheres of argumentation.
1 This is an oversight worth addressing for a few reasons. Chief among Goodnight's (1982) concerns was the "erosion" of the public sphere by privatized technical activity (p. 221); meanwhile, the ethos of the science adviser-a scientist called upon for expert advice in public debatesappears as a salient mediator between technical and public spheres; therefore, the science adviser's ethos seems like a good place to start searching for specific mechanisms of erosion. At the same time, if arguments about uncertainty entail ethos (the un/certain speaker), and there are three spheres of uncertainty, it stands to reason that ethos may perform differently in these spheres. This insight concords with the oldest known definition of ethos as custom, habit, or dwelling place-in other words, a role traditionally associated with a procedure or forum for managing uncertainty (Hyde, 2004) . However, we must remember that ethos is also character-that combination of good sense (phronesis), moral excellence (arête), and goodwill (eunoia) that warrants the claims a person makes about the world (Aristotle, trans. 2007 . So, when a science adviser expresses uncertainty, she both articulates her character and locates herself in a particular forum of argumentation.
These warranting and orienting functions of ethos usefully complicate Goodnight's model by directing our attention to how character performances and forum-specific roles interact to integrate spheres of argumentation. They also help explain the otherwise unpredictable reception of science advisers in the public sphere, a reception that tends to oscillate between "doctor worship" and witch-hunt (Wood, 1964, p. 43) . In this paper we clarify the interactions of uncertainty type, forum of argumentation, and character performance in the reception of science advisers, using several historical cases as touchstones. Understanding these interactions, we contend, can help explain the erosion of the boundaries between public and technical spheres and can help science advisers select more effective ethical performances in public debates.
ETHOS AND THE SPHERES
In his flagship article, Goodnight (1982) does not provide a full-fledged theory of how the spheres of argument stay integrated in a polity, yet this integration is key to the "so what?" of his model: namely, that public deliberation is disappearing into personal and technical spheres. What are the channels that enable this erosion? Goodnight (1982) mentions a "disagreement" as one channel that opens kairos after kairos in sphere after sphere until the uncertainty at stake is resolved or loses its exigence (p. 218); however, Goodnight seems to believe disagreements refresh rather than sap public argumentation. Another, more suspect channel is the mass media, via which "deliberation is replaced by consumption" (Goodnight, 1982, p. 223) ; but while it is easy to see how media consumption might expand personal grounds of evaluation at the expense of public grounds, it is harder to see how it would expand the purview of the technical sphere.
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A more likely agent responsible for sequestering public argumentation in technical forums is hinted at in Goodnight's (1982) lengthy quotations from Charles Beard, the preeminent historian of early 20 th century American technocracy: the technocratic science adviser. Not only do science advisers physically travel back and forth from technical to public forums of argumentation, but technical arguments crucially depend on their ethos. When a science adviser says "I believe humans are causing climate change because my models all point to industry as the prime driver of warming," certainly the reasons ("my models point to industry…") and the grounds (evidence showing that the scientists' models do in fact point to industrial drivers) of that argument are technical. Nonetheless, this argument only coheres if the audience buys its warrant, which is something like "my models are reliable techne for determining climate change." Since the science adviser made the models, the warrant really comes to roost in the character of the adviser herself, in her technical ethos.
Here is the crux of the matter: the adviser's technical ethos has two parts-a role that is bound to technical forums for managing uncertainty; and a character that, while it was developed in technical forums, nonetheless travels with her like a lab coat from sphere to sphere in the course of her daily life. Because technical character can travel in this way, it helps integrate public and technical spheres of uncertainty management: we call on technical experts to help resolve uncertainties in public debate, and this conversation keeps the spheres of argumentation connected and porous.
However, the eminent portability of ethos-as-character can create conflicts with ethosas-role in a particular forum. We are all familiar with these kinds of clashes: consider the eyerolling that commences when a psychologist friend starts pontificating about the behavior of the people at a party (technical ethos performed in a personal forum), the snickering about the personal tics of a politician (personal ethos performed in a public forum), the denunciations following a scientist expressing their political views at a professional meeting (personal ethos performed in a technical forum). These clashes of character and forum are easy to recognize in our daily lives, but we have yet to treat them seriously in the public reception of science advisers. The first step is understanding how types of uncertainty-personal, technical, and political (public)-condition the expected roles of scientists in those forums. The next step will be to consider what happens when science advisers carry all three of their characterspersonal, technical, and political-into public forums.
ETHOS AND UNCERTAINTY IN SCIENCE ADVISING: FORUM
We are in the last phases of conducting a review of the literature on the topos of uncertainty in scientific argumentation. This review has made it clear to us that uncertainty is a boundary object not just between academia and the polis but even among the academic disciplines that work on the problem. Unique definitions of uncertainty populate the literature on systems modeling, cognitive psychology, linguistics, philosophy, rhetoric, sociology, and political science-and yet scholars of scientific argumentation who work with sources from several or all of these disciplines often persist in using the term as if it has a single, consensual definition. While this kind of willful misunderstanding has been shown to be helpful in scaffolding collaboration across political borders (Shackley & Wynne, 1996; Zehr, 1999) , we must be able to recognize the characteristics of different spheres of uncertainty argumentation because they yield different consequences for the ethical performances of science advisers.
Personal Uncertainty
Personal uncertainties revolve around expressions of commitment to particular claims about the world. Cognitive psychologists, epistemologists, linguists, and rhetoricians have studied personal uncertainty in scientific argument, and they have focused in particular on hedging (e.g., "We believe the results are robust" v. "the results are robust" (Hyland, 1998) ), claim strength (e.g., "Evapotranspiration is the primary predictor of plant resilience" v. "We found evapotranspiration to be a significant driver of plant resilience within the study area" (Latour & Woolgar, 1986, pp. 75-90) ), and accommodation (e.g., the tendency of scientific arguments to move up-stasis, generalize, and emphasize novelty as they recruit wider publics; cf. "Scientists have discovered an antioxidant peptide in mussels" v. "Scientists find cure for cancer!" (Fahnestock, 1986) ).
These expressions of personal un/certainty are regulated by norms, the most famous formulation of which is Merton's (1973) CUDOS: communism (the scientist should relate herself to scientific knowledge not as an individual owner but as a member of a community); universalism (the scientist's nationality or ethnicity should not perturb the knowledge s/he acquires); disinterestedness (the scientist's personal agendas should not taint the knowledge s/he acquires); and organized skepticism (the scientist's job is to question rather than to commit herself to scientific knowledge). Mertonian norms prohibit strong expressions of personal commitment to beliefs about nature or to policy predicated on these beliefs. These are norms, not descriptions: in practice, individual scientists have been observed to be selfish, parochial, biased, and dogmatic (Barnes, 1970; Mitroff, 1974) . But that does not stop them from giving lip-service to the norms and enforcing them on their colleagues.
Technical Uncertainty
Technical uncertainties concern scientists' instruments and techniques-which we will combine under the heading techne-for constructing knowledge about nature. Technical uncertainties include those about whether techne are sensitive enough to register the phenomena of interest (metrical uncertainty), uncertainties about whether models are taking into account all the important drivers of a particular phenomenon (structural uncertainty), and uncertainties about how to interpret model results (translational uncertainty; Rowe, 1994) . These uncertainties frequently catalyze public debates about associated risks, especially regarding climate change and nuclear energy. Into these debates the scientist is called as an adviser on the warrant of her technical character.
Technical character and the techne of uncertainty reduction (models, etc.) exist in a kind of ethical symbiosis: the reliability of the techne stand on the reputation of the scientist; meanwhile, the scientist's reputation stands on the strength of the techne she has developed for reducing uncertainty. This symbiotic relationship can result in techne standing in as a proxy for technical character in public debates about uncertainty. Carolyn Miller (2003) found in her study of the Rasmussen report that when audiences asked for judgments about risks, science advisers tended to defer to their models. The models thus stood in for the advisers' technical character and gave them deniability in the case of error or disaster (Miller, 2003, p. 184 ).
Miller called this proxy function "technical ethos"; we will temporarily rename it "techneethos" to avoid confusion with the terminology of Goodnight's model.
Political Uncertainty
Political uncertainties-those negotiated in the public sphere-do not concern questions of knowledge but questions of right action based on shared values. So, we are not dealing here with comprehension but with conviction; not scientific certainty, which is a patent impossibility, but political certainty, which is temporarily and provisionally achievable in policy. And yet the two categories are conflated all the time in policymaking (Pielke, 2007, p. 35) . Both scientists and politicians present the reduction of scientific uncertainty as a means to political certainty, a myth that covers up the role that political values must play in constructing political certainty. This myth scaffolds the continued collaboration of politicians and scientists (Shackley & Wynne, 1996, p. 280) ; it is also the chief facilitator of the problem that most worried Goodnight (1982) -the cooption of public argumentation by the technical sphere.
ETHOS AND UNCERTAINTY IN SCIENCE ADVISING: CHARACTER
Now that we have reviewed the way that spheres of uncertainty argumentation shape the roles science advisers are expected to play in personal, technical, and public forums, we can turn to considering the interaction of these forum-specific roles with the advisers' performances of character.
Generally speaking, scientists' character performances are well-received if they take place in the forum that originally shaped them, e.g., technical character in technical forums, personal character in personal forums. But something odd happens to scientists in public forums: performances of political character (i.e., arguments grounded in appeals to shared values and warranted by citizenship) are not predictably felicitous; in fact, they're often strongly censured. Why?
The obvious answer is that we seem to expect science advisers to continue to perform technical character in political forums: after all, technical expertise formed the grounds for their public calling in the first place. But a logical fallacy hides in this reasoning: the warrant provided by technical expertise does not support political arguments. Political arguments-in Goodnight's (1982) model-engage political, not technical, uncertainties; are grounded in shared values, not techne; and are warranted by political character, not technical character. For example, in an argument about whether cap-and-trade violates the spirit of free-market capitalism, the warrant is "free-market capitalism is important to preserve," a value that a science adviser's methods and models have no traction on and that does not reference her expertise.
Yet, we continue to call scientists into public debates and to insist against logic and practical experience that the reductions in technical uncertainty they can provide will automatically yield reductions in political uncertainty. This insistence is not founded in technical ignorance but on a model of argumentation that pre-dates Goodnight's (1982) model and does not distinguish between technical and public spheres. This Enlightenment model for integrating science and policy tapped natural philosophers (the precursors of our scientists), who were fast discovering the laws that governed all of nature (including human society), as those best qualified to make policy. This technocratic or progressive model unproblematically derived values from facts, conflated technical and political certainties, and called on the science adviser to serve as both arbiter of information and evaluative decision maker (Ferris, 2010, p. 104; Shapin, 2008, p. 24) . But the progressive model is not the only model that dictates the roles our science advisers should play in public forums. A powerful competitor arose in response to abuses of technocracy: the is/ought model, articulated on grounds first laid by David Hume (1740/2010), pursues the logical conundrum articulated above in our discussion of the differences between technical and political uncertainty-namely, that you cannot derive what you "ought" to do from what "is" the case with nature or society; a value structure must always be interpolated before policy can be made (Shapin, 2008, p. 11) . This is the model that split the technical and political spheres. Under the is/ought model, scientists are admonished to do their work in the technical sphere and then somehow pass the results through the membrane separating that sphere from the public sphere to politicians. The politicians then attach shared values to the technical information and make policy on that foundation.
Both models still operate, waxing and waning with the political tides and creating an unpredictable ethical atmosphere for science advisers. When progressive administrations are in power, or when there is a strong national consensus on an issue, the progressive model of science-policy integration dominates, and science advisers achieve powerful policymaking positions that license their performances of political character. However, if they refuse to make policy recommendations in these milieu for some reason-perhaps the habitual practice of CUDOS or fear of reprisal from peers in the technical sphere-they can be censured for obstructing policymaking or lose ground to other scientists who are willing to advocate policy (Brooks, 1964, pp. 85-86; Pielke, 2007, p. 16) . While surely exasperating to the science adviser, these pressures are appreciable from the politician's perspective: if you have reached out in a crisis for advice to someone you believe has special access to knowledge, someone whom you have given millions of dollars to secure this knowledge, you don't want to hear "We don't have enough data to say for sure" or "We don't know." You want answers.
When conservative administrations come to power, on the other hand, or when issues seriously divide public opinion, science advisers are predictably censured for performing personal or political character, as such performances are considered to have transgressed the scientist's proper sphere (technical), even when the adviser has been called into a political forum. The science adviser wears the stereotype of CUDOS into public forums like a lab coat, and politicians and citizens are just as likely as peers to punish a science adviser's expressions of emotion, personal values, or loyalty to a particular party (Porter, 1995, p. 7) .
In a pluralist democracy such as the United States, the political footing for science advisers becomes even more unstable when, say, a progressive executive squares off against a conservative Congress-a charged environment of conflicting values. In these situations, a science adviser can find herself, on a relatively short time span, welcomed into the public sphere on the progressive model and then charged with trespassing on the is/ought model. Such was Robert Oppenheimer's experience between his appointment to the Atomic Energy Commission's advisory committee by Truman in 1947 and the stripping of his security clearance by Eisenhower in 1954; similarly, Michael Mann was appointed to the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1998 but, beginning in 2005, investigated by Congress (and six other agencies) after the publication of the infamous "hockey stick" graph in the IPCC's Third Assessment Report (2001) .
To cope with this volatile ethical environment, science advisers have chosen a range of ethical strategies, but most fall into two categories: foregrounding technical character (techneethos), and foregrounding political character (prophetic ethos). We will briefly examine some illustrative historical cases in these categories: there are no salient examples of science advisers 331 hewing to the personal rigors of CUDOS because refusing to make policy recommendations on the grounds of Disinterestedness and Organized Skepticism virtually guarantees that a scientist won't last as a science adviser (Jasanoff, 1994, p. 16; Pielke, 2007, pp. 4-5) .
Foregrounding Technical Character (Techne-Ethos)
Some science advisers choose to foreground their methods and models as proxies for performances of technical character in public forums. Miller (2003) was the first to document such a case, as mentioned above. Jamieson (2000) observed that economists pushed criticism of their work off on their models, which were amenable to quick repair and improvement in a way that their technical reputations were not (p. 319). Walsh (2013) found that a similar strategy involving climate visualizations helped IPCC scientists deflect attacks on their technical character (pp. 179-180). However, these studies also noted side effects: first, deploying techne-ethos as a shield can lead stakeholders to believe that the techne somehow work independently of the scientist who created them, that they channel natural truths directly and unproblematically; this misconception Walsh (in press) has labeled the "myth of natural inscription." As a result of this myth, a second side effect emerges: stakeholders come to believe that techne, not people, make policy-thus complicating justice and accountability in science policymaking.
Foregrounding Political Character (Prophetic Ethos)
Science advisers can respond to the volatility of the public sphere by foregrounding their political character and calling for policy change on the basis of their special access to knowledge in the technical sphere. Walsh (2013) calls this performance of political character by scientists "prophetic ethos." There are multiple historical examples of science advisers performing prophetic ethos with variable success.
Frequently, science advisers are censured for performances of prophetic ethos, particularly under conservative administrations or in periods of high political uncertainty. Robert Oppenheimer embraced prophetic ethos in the wake of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, sitting on a number of government advisory boards and giving press interviews in which he intoned aphoristic warnings such as "the physicists have known sin," and "we [the U.S. and U.S.S.R.] can be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life" (Bird & Sherwin, 2006, pp. 323, 465) . As indicated above, a change in administrations put Oppenheimer in front of an ethics panel that ended his career as a federal science adviser. Along the same lines, climatologist James Hansen has performed prophetic ethos for the last 25 years, during which he testified before Congress on the dangerous "greenhouse effect," was arrested for sit-in protests of coal mining operations, and published books with titles like Storms of My Grandchildren: The Truth About the Coming Climate Catastrophe and Our Last Chance to Save Humanity. Hansen has experienced a mixed reception of this prophetic performance: on the one hand, he is one of the most recognized public figures associated with climate change debates, and he is credited with putting global warming on the national radar. On the other hand, he has claimed to be repeatedly and systematically censored by Bush administration officials, and he cast his recent retirement from NASA as a response to these pressures (Gillis, 2013) .
In other instances, science advisers have managed to avoid censure and even catalyze policy by performing prophetic ethos. For example, in the kairos surrounding the publication of Silent Spring, Goodnight (1982) and Walker (2013) both observed how Rachel Carson leveraged growing public awareness of a crisis in the use of pesticides, a crisis that had been sequestered until very recently in the technical sphere, in government labs and the confidential internal reports of chemical companies. Against the technocratic ethos of these experts, Carson performed a prophetic ethos, speaking on behalf of silenced mothers and crop-workers. She positioned herself as the people's science adviser, helping them retake the halls of government from the usurping technocrats. She testified before two federal committees and was credited in the eventual banning of DDT (though she had never explicitly advocated a ban) and the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency (which she did explicitly advocate).
Likewise, atmospheric physicists F. Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina (1994) illustrate a case in which the very scientists who discovered the chemical reactions depleting the ozone were also among the first to call for action to stop it and to avert immanent threats. Like Carson, Rowland and Molina took their jeremiad to various polities and were heavily criticized by peers, industry, and politicians for doing so, yet they prevailed and even augmented their technical characters through the political fight.
While these prophetic performances succeeded in many ways, it is clear that they did not bootstrap the agency necessary to catalyze international policy; rather, this agency flowed from a whole series of events that increased political certainty on the issues involved. Carson's performance rode a cresting wave of public fears about chemical and nuclear contaminants, benefited from the media attention already attracted to these fears, and was warmly received by an incoming progressive administration. She also escaped typical channels of censure since she was an independently funded scholar. Rowland and Molina's performance took advantage of a series of heat waves, vivid images of the ozone "hole," and existing cancer frameworks, to name a few amplifiers. All of these factors were clearly beyond the science advisers' control. Thus, while these successful performances of prophetic ethos are instructive, they are not necessarily replicable.
CONCLUSION
Our examination of the interaction of forum and character in the ethical performances of science advisers suggests a new explanatory account of Goodnight's (1982) concerns about the cooption of public argumentation by the technical sphere. First, the spheres model is substantially enabled by the is/ought model for science-policy integration, which "divided the waters" of the technical and public spheres in response to ethical abuses by technocrats. As a result, the public-forum role assigned to science advisers brings with it two incompatible spheric models-one that insists upon and one that refuses to recognize the segregation of the political from the technical. Finally, the conflation of technical and public uncertainties inherent to the progressive model licenses illogical but persuasive technical warrants for public arguments; this rhetorical situation encourages politicians either to cloak their advocacy positions in techne (Pielke, 2007, p. 89) , or to abdicate technical issues to science advisers, and thus to the technical sphere (Lapp, 1965, p. 227 ).
This account is productive for re-considering the integration-both salubrious and problematic-of the spheres of argumentation, but a question remains: what is the best ethical stance for a science adviser in public debates about uncertainty? It should be clear by this point that there is no one-size-fits-all ethical solution to this dilemma. There can be no ethos without kairos, and so a performance of technical ethos that is felicitous for one crisis, time, and forum will not remain so when those kairotic factors shift. That being said, as we enumerated the challenges science advisers have faced in selecting effective ethical strategies, we also observed some felicitous patterns: 1.) When technical uncertainties are at stake in public debates, shifting the warrant of argument to techne (the reliability of models and methods) appears to insulate science advisers' character from attack, even as it reinforces the conflation of technical and political uncertainties; 2.) Under progressive administrations, prophetic performances of political character by science advisers tend to be rewarded, and policy gets made (and often, but not always, the opposite also holds); and 3.) When stakeholders believe that a public crisis has been illegitimately sequestered in the technical sphere, or when a broad consensus begins to emerge on a technical issue, a science adviser may effectively perform prophetic ethos to galvanize popular support for policy change.
These are observations, not recommendations, but they do support our contention that scientists must consider the types of uncertainty at stake-personal, technical, and/or political-as well as the forum they are arguing in when selecting an appropriate ethical stance; the stakes are particularly high for science advisers arguing in public forums.
2 This is the principal counsel we can offer science advisers-along with the recommendation to study cases of uncertainty management that bear on their particular situations before stepping into a public forum to argue about their work. This caution particularly applies to readers of Pielke's (2007) Honest Broker framework. Pielke creates a twoby-two matrix defined by "Views of Science" (as integrated in a "linear" fashion with policy or as an iterative negotiation of scientific opportunity and social need) and "Views of Democracy" (Madisonian pluralist advocacy or Schattschneiderian voting on options selected by technocrats). The result is four "ideal" roles a science adviser can play: the pure scientist, the science arbiter, the issue advocate, and the honest broker. Pielke argues that all four ideal roles should be in circulation for science policy to function well in a democracy, but he's partial to the honest broker-while warning that organizations, not individuals, are best suited for this role and that even honest broker organizations are likely to lose political competitions with issue advocates, who are happy to comply with politicians' demands to narrow and simplify rather than expand and enrich policy landscapes. He provides a heuristic for science advisers to select the appropriate role: in cases of "values consensus and low uncertainty," advisers should serve as pure scientists or science arbiters. In all other cases (lack of consensus and low uncertainty, lack of consensus and high uncertainty, consensus and high uncertainty), he encourages advisers to choose between issue advocate and honest broker, depending on whether they want to narrow or expand policy options. The difficulty for rhetoricians wishing to apply Pielke's heuristic to historical cases is that it is not rhetorical; thus, it brackets out the role of ethos and kairos. First, it doesn't acknowledge the kairotic instability of the science advisers' public role. We have seen in the cases reviewed that the is/ought model and progressive model can conflict in defining this role on short time scales and even between agencies with which the science adviser has to work-and yet forum and kairos are bracketed out of Pielke's heuristic and its generative framework. Second, the heuristic does not acknowledge the unique category of personal uncertainties (expressions of commitment), lumping them in with political uncertainties (expressions of citizenship/articulations of shared values) and thus conflating political certainty with political consensus. A group can have consensus on the range and strength of its shared values and still be unable to commit to taking action if there is no exigence, no kairotic moment. Pielke assumes a high level of exigence in all science policy issues, but this is not always the case. A science adviser's sense of exigence, and thus her level of personal commitment to a policy option, clearly makes a difference when she is trying to choose between issue advocacy and honest brokerage.
